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ToggleNiger: Russia Gains Strength with Nuclear Bet
Niger, an arid country located on the edge of the Sahara and dependent on imported electricity, has become the center of a new international dispute that is redefining the energy and geopolitical landscape of West Africa. Russia has floated the possibility of building a nuclear power plant in the territory, promising not only energy but also a future of greater technological autonomy.
The proposal comes at a time when the Nigerien military junta has definitively severed its historic ties with France, the former colonial power that for more than fifty years exploited Nigerien uranium through the Orano group, without, however, sharing the technological benefits with the supplier country.
More than a simple energy issue, this confrontation represents a clash of strategies and visions about Africa's role in the world. While France loses ground, limited by its colonial legacy and decades of unilateral exploitation, Russia emerges as a new power willing to invest in technical cooperation and offer alternatives to external dependence.
But behind these promises lurk many doubts, both technical and economic, and security-related, in one of the most unstable territories on the planet. It is in this context that Niger's future is at stake: between a past marked by French domination and the risky bet on a Russian partnership that could transform the balance of power in the Sahel.
The Russian Proposal

Russia has presented Niger, a vast arid state on the edge of the Sahara Desert that has to import most of its electricity despite being rich in uranium, with the possibility of building a nuclear power plant in the country, while also providing technological autonomy.
It may be considered impractical and may never happen, but the concept is yet another move by Moscow to gain geopolitical advantage over Western nations. Historically, Niger exported the metal for further refining in France, but that is changing as the country, ruled by a military junta, cuts ties with the former colonial power.
The uranium mining operation, operated by the French nuclear group Orano, was nationalized in June, paving the way for Russia to present itself as a new partner.
There is talk of energy generation and medical applications, with a focus on training local professionals, as part of a cooperation agreement signed between the Russian state corporation Rosatom and the Nigerien authorities.
If it ever comes to fruition, this would be the first nuclear power project in West Africa. Beyond initial discussions, it's unclear how far this path will go. But even with this first gesture, Moscow has demonstrated its understanding of the depth of local frustrations.
The End of the French Era

For more than five decades, Orano—known as Areva until 2018—explored uranium from Niger to supply the nuclear sector, which is at the heart of France's energy strategy. The French state-owned company now obtains most of its supplies from Canada and Kazakhstan and has projects under development in Mongolia and Uzbekistan.
But the connection to Niger remained significant and carried political and perhaps even cultural weight. However, Paris did not share its nuclear energy expertise with its loyal African supplier. Niger, meanwhile, has to rely largely on coal-fired generation and electricity imports from Nigeria.
But now, the breakdown in relations between the Nigerien junta and France has allowed Moscow to offer the hope, albeit distant, of a nuclear future – something that Areva/Orano, throughout so many years of local activity, has never wanted to provide.
“Our task is not just to participate in uranium exploration.”
“We must create an entire system for the development of peaceful nuclear energy in Niger”.
Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev said this on July 28, 2025, during a visit to Niamey, the country's capital.
The Strategic Value of Uranium

Of course, this isn't entirely altruistic. There are economic benefits for Russia, and it's part of a broader effort to displace Western influence from the Sahel region. The Russians may have the opportunity to develop the Imouraren mine, one of the world's largest uranium deposits.
A French plan to develop the site was initially stalled by the collapse of global uranium demand following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. It was revived in mid-2023, only for the military junta that seized power weeks later to cancel Orano's rights to the Imouraren deposit.
Seizing this key asset would cement Russia's already important position in global uranium production, a commodity now so vital to the world's hopes that nuclear power will help reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
And Moscow may well be able to buy, at a favorable price, all or part of the up to 1.400 tons of semi-processed uranium concentrate, known as “yellowcake,” awaiting export from the Sominak mine, operated by Orano in Arlit and seized by Niger in June.
Reserves began to accumulate after the West African regional bloc ECOWAS imposed a trade blockade on Niger following the ouster of the country's civilian president, Mohamed Bazoum, in July 2023. But even after the sanctions were lifted, the new military regime prevented Orano from resuming shipments.
At one point, China also expressed interest in purchasing some of the concentrate. The Nigeriens even explored contacts with Iran, until the United States warned them not to pursue any sales in that specific direction.
Between Promises and Reality
Of course, the image of a Nigerien nuclear power plant, as Tsivilev described it, raises enormous questions—technical, economic, and security-related in a region known for its Islamist militancy. Indeed, the French never seemed to consider the option worthy of serious consideration.
While the refining of the yellowcake ore could be done in Niger, the subsequent conversion, enrichment, and transformation into nuclear fuel was carried out abroad, at the Orano plant in Cap de la Hague, Normandy. From there, it was delivered to French nuclear power plants.
Building a nuclear power plant can take years, and such projects require a huge amount of capital investment. Once operational, they require a broad and reliable power grid. Furthermore, viability depends on the availability of industrial and domestic consumers who can afford the price of the generated energy.
There are also doubts about whether a nuclear power plant could be built and safely protected in the fragile, violence-ridden Sahel. Armed jihadist groups control large swathes of territory in Mali and Burkina Faso, as well as parts of western Niger, making the area highly insecure.
Given the difficulties, costs, and complications of developing the nuclear sector in Niger, this remains a distant prospect. It likely doesn't offer an immediate solution to alleviate the current pressure on energy supplies or the need for economic diversification, but in a sense, these technical issues are lost in the essence of the debate.
A Different View

What Russia was able to capitalize on was the Nigeriens' resentment toward the French assumption that they should be content indefinitely to remain suppliers of raw minerals, with no hope of ever rising to a more industrialized level.
The allied military juntas in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso have already applied their African sovereignist vision to their largest export, gold. New prospecting rules require foreign investors to grant more significant roles to local business partners and ensure that some production is refined domestically, maintaining moreadded value” of jobs and profits at home.
Mali even detained some executives from the Canadian mining company Barrick for months due to a dispute over revenue. Now Niger has also decided to toughen its stance. The closure and subsequent nationalization of Orano's operations were surrounded by mutual recriminations, with the government and the company accusing each other of obstructionism.
The group's director in the country, Ibrahim Courmo, has been detained since May without formal charges. And the current ruling junta appears determined to end the era of French uranium exploration in Niger, an official told the Parisian newspaper: Le Monde that Orano was gorging itself on Niger's natural resources.
Who can say what Moscow's proposals for a nuclear science partnership, and perhaps even for power generation, will ultimately mean in concrete terms? But one thing is clear: in Niger, it was the Russians who correctly read the political climate.
Conclusion
The dispute over Niger's uranium goes beyond mere control over a mineral deposit: it is a battle for political and economic influence in Africa. Although Niger's nuclear future remains distant, the episode illustrates a fundamental shift: the redefinition of African sovereignty over its strategic resources has already transformed the political landscape of the Sahel.
While Paris is losing ground, unable to respond to criticism of decades of exploitation without local development, Moscow presents itself as a new player willing to invest not only in extraction, but also in the promise of knowledge transfer and the creation of industrial capacity.
However, technical, financial, and security challenges raise serious doubts about the viability of a nuclear project in the Sahel. Between promises and tensions, what becomes clear is that Niger no longer accepts the role of a passive supplier of raw materials and seeks to assert itself as a protagonist of its own energy future.
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Picture: © 2024 Issifou Djibo / EPA via Shutterstock
