The legal basis for the mission already exists. Resolution 2803, adopted by the Security Council on November 17, 2025, by 13 votes in favor and two abstentions, authorized member states working with the Peace Board to establish a temporary international force in Gaza. The mandate goes beyond simply observing a truce.

According to the text approved by the UN, the force can support the destruction of military infrastructure, contribute to the removal of weapons from non-state groups, protect civilians and humanitarian operations, and train selected Palestinian police. The authorization to adopt "all necessary measures" gives the force a much greater operational scope than that of observation missions.

This plan also reduces the autonomy of African contingents. The UN Peace Board's report, dated May, indicates a unified command of the United States of America (USA) under Major General Jasper Jeffers and close coordination with Egypt and Israel. Thus, Uganda would not decide on its own where to act, when to advance, or how to respond to ceasefire violations.

Another unresolved issue concerns the legal status of military personnel on the ground. During parliamentary debate in Uganda, Defense Minister Kiryowa Kiwanuka stated that an agreement on the status of the forces would be signed after legislative authorization. This instrument should define the jurisdiction, immunities, movement, discipline, and logistical support of foreign contingents.

For now, the effective entry depends on the execution of the political plan, the Israeli withdrawal from the designated areas, and the phased disarmament of Hamas. While these conditions remain disputed, Uganda can prepare its military and equipment without knowing precisely when they will arrive in Gaza or what security environment they will encounter during the first rotation.

In military terms, the risk arises from the overlap between peacekeeping functions and enforcement tasks. Monitoring a ceasefire is different from participating in a disarmament process, destroying military infrastructure, or protecting aid corridors under armed contestation. If the agreement between Israel and Hamas stalls again, African soldiers may find themselves caught between forces with incompatible objectives.

Unlike a classic United Nations operation, the mission will not be commanded by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The political center will be the Board of Peace, and the US will lead the military chain. For Uganda and Burundi, this structure makes it essential to demonstrate that their contingents in Gaza are protecting civilians under an international mandate.

Political sensitivity is heightened for Uganda because the country is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. An African force perceived as an extension of Israeli security could incur diplomatic costs with Muslim partners and fuel internal opposition.

Conversely, a disciplined presence linked to humanitarian aid and Palestinian protection could reinforce the legitimacy of the participation. Regarding material costs, the US administration notified Congress of over $206 million allocated to equipment, infrastructure, vehicles, and force operations.

The total cost was not disclosed. External funding may alleviate the national burden, but it does not replace decisions regarding medical evacuation, compensation, rotations, supplies, and liability for casualties. The experience gained by Uganda and Burundi in Somalia constitutes an operational advantage, but also serves as a warning.

Their contingents are involved in prolonged missions whose political resolution depends on external actors. Gaza presents additional challenges such as high urban density, intense media pressure, and a legal dispute—factors capable of transforming any tactical incident into an immediate diplomatic problem.

From a diplomatic standpoint, Kampala's interest can be analyzed without confusing it with an officially declared position. Uganda would reinforce its image as a security provider beyond East Africa and move closer to a Washington-sponsored initiative at a time when funding for African missions in Somalia faces uncertainty.

This interpretation finds cautious support in the observations of researcher Paul D. Williams. According to him, Uganda and Burundi have accumulated experience in operations against al-Shabaab and may seek new avenues for financial and material support for their armies as the Somali mission loses momentum. Participation in Gaza with US support offers this possibility.

For Burundi, which has not yet made any formal commitment, the equation also includes seeking diplomatic visibility. Participating in a force supported by the US and coordinated with Egypt and Israel would place Bujumbura within a security architecture with actors to whom it rarely has direct operational access.

Kampala has a more advanced internal political base. Parliament authorized the deployment after Kiryowa Kiwanuka reported that Donald Trump had contacted Yoweri Museveni through emissaries in July. The decision gives the President leeway to mobilize the contingent if the force advances and brings Uganda closer to Washington and Israel without guaranteeing any diplomatic benefits.

For this reason, the African calculation remains difficult. Uganda and Burundi can convert their military experience into influence and support, but they are taking risks whose evolution they cannot control. The sequence between the disarmament of Hamas and the Israeli withdrawal remains blocked. Entering Gaza may give them prominence, but it would also transfer the cost of an external stalemate to African soldiers.

Uganda has moved beyond the hypothetical stage: it has parliamentary authorization and approximately 1.200 troops committed to an international force destined for Gaza. Burundi remains at an earlier stage, having expressed interest in the talks but without any final public decision. The difference between the two countries shows that the composition of the force remains incomplete.

The timetable for deployment, the status of the forces, the rules of engagement, and the political sequence between the Israeli withdrawal and the disarmament of Hamas remain to be defined. US funding is beginning to take shape, but it does not resolve the military, legal, and diplomatic risks that will accompany any deployment of African contingents.

If the political framework fails, the gap between stabilization and direct participation in the conflict could disappear. Kampala could gain visibility and support while Bujumbura seeks a similar space. However, it will be the African soldiers who bear the human cost of decisions whose execution remains dependent on Israel, Hamas, Washington, and regional mediators.