Even monkeys have imagination.
The existence of imagination in apes has ceased to be a literary hypothesis and has entered the realm of scientific evidence. A study conducted by researchers from Johns Hopkins University and the University of St Andrews demonstrated that an adult bonobo was able to participate in pretend play in a consistent and controlled manner.
The research published in the journal Science This challenges one of the most persistent symbolic boundaries of the human condition: the idea that imagining absent objects and acting as if they existed is a skill exclusively our own. The protagonist of the experiments is called Kanzi, a 43-year-old bonobo already known for understanding verbal instructions and interacting with lexicographical symbols.
Seated face-to-face with the scientists in a staging resembling a children's tea party, Kanzi pointed to glasses of imaginary juice and jars of pretend grapes as if mentally acknowledging the existence of something that was not physically present.
Imagination in apes thus moves from the anecdotal realm to the experimental field, opening up new questions about the depth of the animal mind and the evolutionary roots of creativity.
The Pretend Play Test
The experiments were designed to eliminate ambiguities and rule out any simplistic interpretation based on conditioning. In a controlled environment, without hidden stimuli or involuntary cues from the researchers, a scientist tilted an empty jar and simulated pouring imaginary juice into two equally empty transparent glasses.
The gesture was deliberately clear, but not theatrical, without exaggeration or verbal reinforcement that could guide the response. Then, the investigator pretended to pour the contents of one of the glasses and asked Kanzi where the juice was. The bonobo repeatedly pointed to the "full" glass, the one that, within the narrative logic, still contained the non-existent liquid.
The response remained the same, even when the physical position of the cups on the table was changed. This is crucial, because if the animal were only memorizing the initial location of the object, it would become disoriented when the containers were moved.
However, Kanzi mentally followed the fiction created by the human and updated the information as if the invisible object were moving with the chosen container. To reinforce the robustness of the protocol, the researchers introduced a determining variable: they placed a glass with real juice next to the glass with imaginary juice.
The question was no longer just "where's the juice?" but also "which one do you prefer?". When faced with the possibility of receiving a real reward, Kanzi almost always chose the cup with real liquid.
This distinction demonstrates that the bonobo was neither confused nor did it believe that the imaginary juice physically existed, maintaining two cognitive layers simultaneously: that of symbolic play and that of tangible reality.
The Confirmation
In a third series of trials, the scenario was repeated with grapes. The scientist pretended to remove a grape from an empty container and place it in one of two jars. Then he pretended to empty one of them and asked Kanzi where the grapes were. The bonobo indicated the jar consistent with the fictional narrative.
Although not all answers were correct, the pattern of success was consistent and statistically significant. The study of imagination in apes thus ceases to depend on occasional reports and becomes grounded in a replicable and controlled experimental design.
What Changes in Science
Comparative cognitive science has shown that abilities such as empathy, tool use, and social learning are not exclusive to humans. By finding that the mental life of these primates extends beyond the immediate, this study forces us to reconsider the assumptions ingrained in our collective understanding.
Imagination in apes adds a new layer to this revision, suggesting that symbolic representation may also have shared roots, challenging the traditional view of the human mind as an exception. When Jane Goodall documented chimpanzees making and using tools, the definition of humanity underwent a profound shake-up.
While making instruments was not exclusive to Homo sapiensThe boundary had to be shifted. Now, something similar can happen in the mental realm. If a bonobo can mentally conceive of a non-existent object, follow its fictitious “movement,” and distinguish this fiction from reality, then symbolic thought ceases to be a human monopoly.
The evolutionary implication is equally relevant. Humans and bonobos share a relatively recent common ancestor on the geological timescale. If elements of imagination were already present in this common lineage, then the cognitive basis of human creativity may be much older than previously thought.
This research paves the way for studies on future planning, episodic memory, and theory of mind in great apes. The debate shifts from the question "are they capable?" to "how far are they capable?". This change alters the very framework of research in comparative psychology.
The Scientific Study
Christopher Krupenye, one of the study's co-authors, described the results as transformative, emphasizing that the mental life of these animals seems to go "beyond the here and now." The importance of these results lies not only in the curiosity of the episode, but in the erosion of an old conceptual boundary: for decades, imagination was treated as a distinctive marker of the human species.
Mentally projecting absent objects, playing pretend, or manipulating symbols of something that is not present were seen as evolutionary stages that radically separated humans from other animals.
Amalia Bastos, another co-author, pointed out that the data suggests that apes can mentally conceive of absent things and simultaneously recognize that they are not real. This dual operation—creating and distinguishing—constitutes the central element of symbolic thought. Imagination in apes thus becomes part of the debate on comparative cognition, animal ethics, and the evolution of the mind.
Ethical Implications
The ethical dimension almost inevitably arises when one recognizes the mental complexity in a non-human animal. If imagination in apes implies the ability to represent absent scenarios, then we may be facing rudimentary forms of anticipation, narrative memory, or even projected suffering.
An individual capable of mentally conceiving something that is not present can also recall past experiences with greater depth or anticipate future consequences. This possibility reconfigures how captive practices, laboratory research, and conservation are approached.
The traditional view of animals as essentially reactive entities, limited to immediate stimuli, loses consistency in the face of evidence of symbolic activity. If there is a mental space where non-existent objects can be cognitively manipulated, then that space can equally accommodate complex emotions.
Krupenye argued that these findings should lead society to reconsider the idea that other animals live almost mechanical lives. The recognition of rich and structured minds introduces increased responsibility. In contexts of destruction of habitatWith illegal trafficking and population decline of great apes, the issue ceases to be merely ecological and becomes a moral one as well.
Protecting species with sophisticated cognitive abilities implies recognizing that we are not only preserving biodiversity, but also safeguarding forms of consciousness.
Imagination regarding apes does not equate humans with bonobos. The differences remain vast. However, the discovery brings the two sides of the border closer and makes the narrative of absolute exceptionality less comfortable.
At a historical moment when animal rights and the legal status of higher primates are being debated, studies like this add scientific foundation to discussions that were previously dominated by philosophy. Science does not dictate ethics, but it provides the material for it, and that material has now become more complex.
Conclusion
The research published in the journal Science does not end the debate. On the contrary, it opens a new phase of questions.
Can apes imagine the future? Can they represent what another individual knows or feels? Imagination in apes ceases to be a curiosity and becomes the focus of investigation into consciousness, symbolism, and evolution.
Looking at Kanzi sitting at an empty table pointing at an invisible cup, science discovers that perhaps make-believe is not just a children's game, but rather a shared heritage from a much older lineage.
So, even apes have imaginations. What do you think about that? We want to know your opinion, do not hesitate to comment and if you liked the article, share and give a “like/like”.
Picture: © 2025 Ape Initiative
